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Introduction 
The effectiveness of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping has become a topic of 
extensive debate. Analyzing quantitative data on peacekeeper deployment, violent 
incidents, battlefield and civilian casualties, a number of studies have found that 
peacekeeping operations (PKOs) ‘work’ by shortening conflict episodes (Ruggeri, 
Dorussen and Gizelis 2017), extending periods of political stability following conflict 
(Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2008), and reducing casualties (Hultman, 
Kathman and Shannon 2013; 2014). Yet detailed case studies of (UN) peacekeeping 
operations have highlighted their many shortcomings and raise doubts on whether 
peacekeeping is effective (Paris 2004; Howard 2008; Autesserre 2010). Admittedly, 
little remains known about how peacekeeping works, and whether peacekeeping is 
indeed a sufficient and necessary element of conflict resolution.  
 
It is often overlooked that the UN is only one of the many actors involved in conflict 
resolution (Greig and Diehl 2005; Autesserre 2014; Clayton and Dorussen 2018), and 
peacekeeping only one of instruments in the UN repertoire (Beardsley, Cunningham 
and White 2015; Benson and Tucker 2017). Ignoring the context of peacekeeping 
risks misattributing credit or blame. For example, the UN peacekeeping mission to 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) is generally evaluated as successful, but the UK military 
intervention, operation Palliser, arguably played a crucial role in suppressing the civil 
war creating the necessary conditions for UN peacekeepers to operate effectively. 
Also in the Central African Republic, Mali and Timor-Leste, third-party military 
interventions (by France, NATO and Australia respectively) set the stage for UN 
PKOs. In Mozambique, mediation by the Vatican and the UN created conditions for 
ONUMOZ a highly successful UN PKO. In contrast, the Rwanda genocide was as 
much a failure of UN political involvement as peacekeeping. However, whereas 
comprehensive data on UN peacekeeping are increasingly available (Clayton et al 
2016), information on other UN conflict resolution instruments remains limited.   
 
A number of recent studies have begun exploring the political context of 
peacekeeping. Greig and Diehl (2005) argue that armed conflicts are likely to 
continue as long as uncertainty remains about balance of power, costs of conflict and 
resolve. Compared to decisive military victories, conflict outcomes supported by 
mediation and peacekeeping reveal less information making them less stable. Greig 
and Diehl (2005) and Beardsley (2008) find that mediated conflict outcomes of 
interstate conflict are indeed more likely to fail. Yet peacekeeping could offset the 
fragility of mediated outcomes. Beardsley, Cunningham and White (2015) observe 
that diplomatic efforts complement peacekeeping. Clayton and Dorussen (2018) also 
note that peacekeeping and mediation often go together. They argue that 
peacekeeping provides valuable information and creates favorable conditions for 
mediation. After the conflict officially ends, peacekeepers are often needed to support 
the fragile peace, while at the same time mediation is essential to ensure the 
effectiveness of peacekeepers. Empirically, Clayton and Dorussen (2018) find that 
mediation shortens armed conflict and that the pacifying effect of peacekeeping is 
conditional on mediation. Interestingly, they also note that with existing data it is 
impossible to disentangle the impact of mediation and peacekeeping on the recurrence 
of conflict. 
 
To address these concerns, we have compiled data on the full range of instruments the 
UN employs to advance peace and stability. After briefly introducing the data, we will 
describe how they help us to identify different types of UN peacemaking instruments 
based on what they aim to achieve (tasks), when they are applied (trends) and to what 
conflicts (selection).  
 
United Nations Peacemaking Data 
The United Nations Peacemaking Initiative (UNPI) Data Project compiles data on the 
full spectrum of UN institutions aimed at conflict prevention and crisis management, 
mediation, peacekeeping and –building. The ultimate aim of the project is to provide 
an empirical basis to assess the relative contributions of various UN instruments that 
attempt to manage violent conflict. In particular, the data seeks to provide researchers 
the opportunity to study possible selection bias in their implementation, and any 
effects of how the different instruments are sequenced or applied simultaneously; in 
short in what ways the various instruments are complements or substitutes. 
 
The UNPI data encompasses all UN political initiatives from 1946 until 2015, and 
includes information on the timing of the conflict management tools, the mandated 
functions, and the main actors involved. The data can be merged with existing data on 
UN and non-UN PKOs, third-party mediation, as well as the UCDP conflict data. The 
data rely on two main sources. The source of the political initiatives from the UN 
Security Council (SC) is the Repertoire of the Practices of the Security Council 
(http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/structure.shtml). The Repertoire contains 
information on subsidiary organs and enforcement mechanisms of the SC under 
various headings, such as commissions and investigative bodies, sanctions 
committees, standing and ad hoc committees, groups and panels, international 
tribunals, missions of the SC and the Secretary General (SG), peace-building offices, 
peacekeeping missions, political missions and offices, representatives, mediators, 
coordinators and good offices, working groups, and proposed organs. The Yearly 
Reports (http://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/1) of the General Assembly 
(GA) are the source of information on its subsidiary organs, only including those with 
a peace and stability mandate, and encompassing boards, commissions, committees, 
assemblies and councils, working groups, positions or bodies recommended by the 
GA and created by the SG (if they are unrelated to the SC). The GA data also include 
subsidiaries of abovementioned organs; such as the Peacebuilding Commission and 
the election observation operations from the Human Rights Commission. UNPI 
includes 478 unique UN missions encompassing 3,351 mission years. 
 
Tasks of Political Missions 
Political missions are mandated to implement a wide variety of tasks. UNPI identifies 
36 different ‘functions’, and regularly missions have multiple tasks. The most 
common ones are guidance – reporting and offering suggestions to the UN and the SC 
(mandated for 212 missions or 36% of all missions), implementation (209 missions or 
35%), conflict management in the form of mediation, good offices and negotiations 
(202 missions, or 34%), and political development by means of supporting and 
restoring administrative functions  (197 missions or 33%), and observation mandated 
for 179 missions (30%). The data identify 115 decolonization committees (20%); 
generally linked to the Special Committee on Decolonization established by the UN 
General Assembly. Notably, the mandates of political missions regularly vary over 
time, which is captured in the yearly version of UNPI.   
 
The official ‘classification’ of different types of political missions in the Repertoire 
and Yearly Reports varies over time making it of limited use. Instead, UNPI classifies 
political missions around four thematic clusters: diplomatic, technocratic, political 
development and peacekeeping. The clusters correspond roughly to division of 
political missions used in UN documentation (United Nations 2013), but applied to 
the full range of missions. Approximately 11% of all missions are diplomatic, 
encompassing special envoys, advisers, representatives and mediators; for example, 
part of the UN Department of Political Affairs, the Special Adviser to the Secretary 
General on Cyprus, Mr. Espen Barth Eide represents the UN Security Council on all 
matters related to the peace process. Technocratic missions include sanctions 
monitoring teams, panels, ad hoc committees, groups of experts and investigations 
(≈42%). As an example, UN Security Council Resolution 1564 requested the 
Secretary General to set up the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to 
investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, 
and to report back to the Security Council. Missions in the political development 
clusters include commissions, UN field offices, peace-building missions, and 
tribunals (≈23%). The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is an example of a 
political mission established by UN Security Council Resolution 1500 at the request 
of the Iraqi government. UNAMI supports political and electoral developments and 
coordinates humanitarian support. UNAMI is administered by the UN Department of 
Political Affairs, but supported by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 
The fourth cluster, peacekeeping missions (for example MONUSCO in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo) and military observers (such as UNMOGIP at the 
border between India and Pakistan), encompass about 24% of all missions.  
 
Trends 
The number of political and peacekeeping missions has been increasing over time. 
Figure 1 shows that the trend of different types of political missions.  
 
The number of political missions began to increase from the early 1960s. 
Technocratic missions (including sanctions and decolonization) committees witnessed 
a strong growth in the 1960s following the establishment of the Special Committee on 
Decolonization in 1961. Political missions, however, were already in this early period 
an important conflict management tool and outnumbered peacekeeping missions.  
 
The pattern is even more apparent in the post-Cold War period where the number of 
political missions has grown dramatically, while the number of peacekeeping 
missions has remained relative stable after an initial jump from about 10 to 20 
missions. All types of missions increased in the post-Cold War period, and the 
number of diplomatic, technocratic and political missions exceeded the number of 
peacekeeping missions from 2005. These developments show how the UN has been 
giving increasing importance to its political initiatives. 
 
 Figure 1: Number of Diplomatic, Technocratic, Political Development, and 
Peacekeeping Missions per year 
 
Political Missions and Conflict Resolution 
An interesting feature of the UNPI data is that it links political missions with specific 
armed conflicts. Political missions carry out good offices and conflict prevention, but 
inevitably these efforts fail to avert conflict in a number of cases. The peacemaking 
and –building activities of political missions regularly extend post-conflict. Table 1 
shows the frequency with which political and peacekeeping missions are linked to 
conflict, indicating if a mission was present in the period before, during, and after 
conflict. Technocratic and peacekeeping missions are the most frequent prior to 
conflict, though a relatively high percentage of diplomatic missions also occur in this 
period. Technocratic and peacekeeping missions are the most likely to engage in 
peacemaking. A high proportion of diplomatic and political development missions 
occur after conflict, and as expected, there is also a high frequency of peacekeeping 
missions in this period.  
 Table 1: Political and Peacekeeping Missions and Conflict 
UN Missions  Conflict   
 Before During After  
Diplomatic 56 (19%) 119 (41%) 118 (40%) 293 (100%) 
Technocratic 170 (26%) 393 (60%) 91 (14%) 654 (100%) 
Pol. Development 51 (10%) 273 (53%) 194 (37%) 518 (100%) 
Peacekeeping  97 (15%) 358 (57%) 178 (28%) 633 (100%) 
All  374 (12%) 1,143 (39%) 581 (49%) 2,098 (100%) 
Note: Mission-year observations linked to conflict out of a total of 3,351 mission-year 
observations. Conflict-years identified via UCDP data.  
 
Table 2 provides a cross tabulation of the various clusters of political missions and 
different conflict outcomes, defined according to the UCDP Conflict Termination 
Dataset (Kreutz 2010). Peacekeeping missions are regularly deployed as part of a 
peace agreement and, as shown in Table 2, are indeed somewhat more often 
associated with this outcome. Peacekeeping missions are also somewhat less 
associated with military victories, or when one side has comprehensively defeated or 
eliminated the opposition, who may have recognized defeat through capitulation or 
public announcement. In contrast, diplomatic missions are relatively more often 
associated with military victories, but less with stalemates. Stalemates are defined as 
‘low activity’ outcomes with the incompatibility unresolved and conflict activities 
continuing but with less than 25 battle-related deaths in any given year. A similar 
pattern applies to political development missions. Finally technocratic missions are 
concentrated in stalemates, while relatively less deployed to conflict that end (or have 
ended) in either a peace agreement or a military victory for one side. Table 2 gives 
some preliminary indication of the effectiveness of the various conflict management 
tools at the disposal of the UN, but also shows that different clusters of missions are 
not randomly deployed. It follows that a full analysis of the relative effectiveness of 
the various clusters of missions needs to control for selection bias.  
 
Table 2: Political and Peacekeeping Missions and Conflict Outcome 
UN Missions Peace 
Agreement 
Military 
Victory 
Stalemate*  
Diplomatic 5 (36%) 5 (36%) 4 (29%) 14 (100%) 
Technocratic 9 (30%) 6 (20%) 15 (50%) 30 (100%) 
Political 
Development 
10 (38%) 8 (31%) 8 (31%) 26 (100%) 
Peacekeeping  15 (39%) 9 (24%) 14 (37%) 38 (100%) 
All 39 (36%) 28 (26%) 41 (38%) 108 
Note: Missions linked to conflict out of a total of 471 missions. Conflict episodes 
identified via UCDP data. *Outcome coded as stalemate if number of battle deaths in 
any year dropped below 25. 
 
 
Conclusions 
In contrast to increasing academic interest in UN peacekeeping missions, relatively 
little attention has been paid to its political initiatives. Yet the UN responds to 
conflicts using a range of tools, which increasingly involves political missions. The 
UNPI data highlights the varied collection of instruments and functions undertaken by 
existing bodies. It promises to address the current lack of understanding of why and 
where missions, other than peacekeeping, are deployed. Eventually, the data should 
help us to determine the effect of these different forms of missions on conflict and 
conflict resolution.  
 
In evaluating the relative effectiveness of different conflict management tools, it is 
arguably important to consider the context in which they are deployed. Possible 
Comment [HD1]: CORRECT IN 
PROOFS 
selection bias is now commonly recognized as an issue for studying the effectiveness 
of peacekeeping. There is however good preliminary evidence to suggest that it may 
also be an issue when studying political missions. Possibly, even more important is 
that different types of missions are often deployed simultaneously or sequentially. 
This has not only important implications for research design, but also clearly for 
policy research. As recently noted by UN Secretary Guterres: 
 
I call on Member States to sustain your political engagement and push 
for political solutions and inclusive peace processes, including through 
bilateral diplomacy and sanctions if necessary. A peacekeeping operation 
is not an army, or a counter-terrorist force, or a humanitarian agency. It is 
a tool to create the space for a nationally owned political solution.1  
  
Yet the need for coordination between different political and peacekeeping missions 
has received only limited academic attention so far; see Heldt (2013) for an exception. 
The Peacemaking Data will thus be important for a number of research questions, 
such as, why particular countries and conflicts witness certain types of political 
missions; when do different UN missions complement, substitute, or possibly even 
undermine other forms of conflict management, and what are the effects of political 
missions beyond conflict management, e.g., on one-side violence, the implementation 
of peace agreements, democratization, economic development, refugees and internally 
displaced persons?    
  
                                                        
1
 UN Secretary General Guterres remarks to Security Council High-Level Debate on 
Collective Action to Improve UN Peacekeeping Operations, 28 March 2018  
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